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A Web of Deceit: A Neo-Gricean View on Types

Abstract

This paper differentiates between several types of verbal deception and related notions: lying, bald-faced lies, bullshit, and deception without lying, inclusive of half-truths/lies of omission and withholding information. This is done in the light of the Gricean work on speaker meaning materialising as what is said and implicature, both being dependent on maxims, which can be observed or nonfulfilled (flouted or violated). To meet this objective, both Grice's and neo-Gricean postulates on truthfulness, lying and deception are revisited. Defining distinct types of deception with Grice's concepts, the paper teases out the complex interdependence between the two levels of speaker meaning: (un)truthful implicature and (un)truthful what is said.

Keywords

deception, deception without lying, lying, flouting of a maxim, implicature, speaker meaning, violation of a maxim, what is said

1. Introduction

Deception is typically understood as intentionally causing the hearer to (continue to) hold a *false belief*, i.e. to believe to be true something the speaker *believes to be false* (e.g. Bok, 1978; Barnes, 1997; Coupland, 2004; Mahon, 2007; Dilmon, 2009). Deception is then heavily dependent on the speaker's belief, namely on the speaker's untruthfulness, not on what is objectively false (lacking in truth), even if the two cases may, and frequently do, coincide (e.g. Bok, 1978; Meibauer, 2005, 2010; but see Green, 2001; Carson, 2006, 2010). On the other hand, according to the standard definition (e.g. Mannison, 1969; Bok, 1978; Williams, 2002; Mahon, 2008b; Fallis, 2009), lying is making a statement/assertion which the speaker believes to be false/untrue with a view to deceiving the hearer, by having the hearer believe the statement/ assertion to be true. On the strength of these definitions, it is evident that lying is a type of deception (Bok, 1978; Chisholm and Feehan, 1977; Vincent

and Castelfranchi, 1981; Adler, 1997, see Mahon, 2008b). Incidentally, some authors (e.g. Carson, 2006, 2010; Sorensen, 2007; Fallis 2009) may be averse to this claim, given that they argue in favour of lies devoid of the speaker's deceptive intent, namely *bald-faced lies* (Carson, 2006, 2010; Sorensen, 2007; cf. Mahon, 2008a), which are here claimed not to be lies, technically speaking (see Section 4.1.1).

Essentially, verbal deception (vs. non-verbal deception) is divided into *lying* and (verbal) *deception without lying*. According to many researchers (e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, 1977; Bok, 1978; Vincent and Castelfranchi, 1981; Barnes, 1997; Saul, forth), two criteria, namely verbal and non-verbal means of expression, as well as (lack of) truthfulness of the statement, are central to the differentiation between lying and other forms of deception without lying, which some authors call *misleading* (Green, 2001; Saul, forth). Incidentally, some authors tend not to allow for the fact that, technically, lying is a type of deception, or even dissociate lying from deception, thus using the term "deception" as a default ellipsis (here, avoided) for "deception without lying". Deception without lying embraces a number of subtypes, such as *half-truths* (Vincent and Castelfranchi, 1981; Vincent Marrelli, 2002; Saul, forth) also known as *lies of omission* (Chisholm and Feehan, 1977; Douglas, 1976; Ekman, 1985; Mooney, 2004; Mahon 2008a), and *bullshit* (Frankfurt, 2005, 2006; Carson, 2006, 2010).

This paper is devoted to an exegesis of Grice's (1989b [1975], 1989c [1978], 1989d) observations on lying and a critical overview of neo-Gricean literature on lying and other forms of deception (with a few references to post-Gricean research as well). The primary objective is then to depict the full interdependence between several types of deception and maxim *nonfulfilment* (*flouting* or *violation*), as well as *implicature* or *what is said*. Therefore, a few concepts proposed by Grice (1989a) will be revisited in order to elucidate, and distinguish between, the main types of deception, coupled with its various second-order mechanisms.

2. Truthfulness and Lack of

The notion of deception, together with its salient type, lying, is frequently contrasted with *truthfulness*. Central to the distinction is the Aristotelian/ Kantian category of Quality (Vincent Marrelli, 2002), further pursued by Grice (1989b [1975], 1989c [1978], 1989d). A few manifestations of untruthfulness (Vincent Marrelli, 2002) can be distinguished, according to their overtness/covertness and the speaker's (lack of) intention to be untruthful.

Of paramount importance here are the speaker-intended types bifurcating into overt untruthfulness and covert untruthfulness. The former coincides with rhetorical figures, such as metaphor or irony, which, in Grice's terms, operate on flouting the first maxim of Quality. Overt untruthfulness includes also "many ritualized social, and, perhaps some ego- and alter- face-saving or protective 'lies' where an underlying assumed social contract of 'collusion' for pretending or mutual deception, is doing the cueing, rendering the strategy 'overt'" (Vincent Marrelli, 2002: 15). Essentially, overt untruthfulness embraces all cases in which the speaker does not subscribe to the meaning of his/her utterance taken literally and wants the hearer to appreciate its untruthfulness. The speaker wishes the hearer to recognise the intended meaning of the overtly untruthful utterance, which they both know not to be what the speaker believes or wants the hearer to believe at the level of what is said, but which carries *implied meaning* emerging from *implicature*¹ materialised by *flouting* the Quality maxims. On the other hand, covert untruthfulness pertains to lying and other forms of deception, which manifest "a covert, non-communicative and intentionally non-communicated super-goal" (Vincent Marrelli, 2002: 15).

In his seminal lecture, Grice (1989b [1975]: 30) conceptualises a conversational framework (which holds also for other forms of interaction) based on the *Cooperative Principle* and subordinate *maxims* subscribing to four categories, which underlie the emergence of speaker-intended meanings: *what is said*, when the maxims are observed; and *implicature*, when they are flouted. Additionally, Grice (1989b [1975]: 30) proposes the notion of *violation* as one of the ways of failing to fulfil a maxim, which is of key significance to the concepts of lying and deception without lying discussed here. Grice (1989b [1975]: 30) suggests that the speaker "may quietly and unostentatiously *violate* a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead". Given the intrinsic speaker-intended covertness of maxim violations² from the hearer's purview, one may venture to claim that they necessarily generate "misleading",

¹ Whilst in Grice's (1989b [1975]) parlance, "implicature" means "implying", it has been synonymous with the meaning implied (and, ideally, inferred by the hearer), originally Grice's "implicatum".

² It must be noted that Grice (1989b [1975]) is inconsistent in using the term "violation". He introduces it in reference to covert maxim nonfulfilment but uses it also as regards (overt) floutings (1989b [1975]: 31-33): "apparent violations" (1989b [1975]: 31), which he also calls "overt violations" (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 36), or "seeming, not real violations" (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 370). Also, Grice appears to contrast "real" violations with "apparent" violations (1989b [1975]: 35), which seem to be floutings, which engender implicatures, as Grice's example bears out. Also, other forms of maxim nonfulfilment which Grice mentions include *clashes* of maxims and *opting out*, which may be considered redundant (Dyner, 2009; cf. Mooney, 2004).

here called “deception”. Specifically, utterances which show maxim violation will be classified as lying or other forms of verbal deception without lying, which may serve superordinate goals, such as manipulation. On the other hand, even overt maxim nonfulfilment, i.e. flouting, may give rise to deception without lying dependent on *untruthful implicature* (see Section 4.5).

According to some authors (Akmajian et al., 2001; Habermas, 1998), it is Grice’s Quality supermaxim that coincides with “truthfulness” (understood as stating the facts), here called “truth”, whilst the first maxim of Quality involves the speaker’s beliefs, i.e. “sincerity”, which is here called “truthfulness”. On the other hand, in their post-Gricean work, Wilson (1995) and Wilson and Sperber (2002) dub the first maxim the “truthfulness maxim”. Indeed, although Grice does not state this explicitly when using the term “truth”, it seems that both the supermaxim and the two maxims of Quality should be interpreted in terms of the speaker’s truthfulness, i.e. the intention to express true beliefs rather than the objective truth insofar as the speaker may be wrong. This interpretation is motivated by the fact that the whole Gricean model resides in the speaker’s intention, speaker meaning and rationality (see e.g. Dynel, 2009, 2010a), whilst (objective) truth is not discussed.

Vincent Marrelli (2002) rightly notes that Grice proposes the supermaxim of Quality as the superordinate notion which concerns communication on the whole, whether or not by literal means of expression. Writing about the “maxim of Quality”, most likely having the supermaxim in mind, Grice (1989d) states that it enjoys a privileged status and necessitates truthful contributions:

The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision of contributions which are genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious), does not seem to be just one among a number of recipes for producing contributions; it seems rather to spell out the difference between something’s being, and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of contribution at all. False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information. (Grice, 1989d: 371)

However, in his 1975 lecture, Grice claims that it is the first maxim of Quality that must be fulfilled, unless it is flouted for the sake of implicature. In other words, Grice (1989b [1975]) presents the violation of the first maxim of Quality as being conducive to lying, at the same time averring that the first maxim of Quality must be satisfied, or at least cannot be violated, for other maxims to come into operation:

Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied. While this may be correct, so far as the generation of

implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims. (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 27)

On the whole, Grice may be understood to claim that in order to convey some information, one must believe it to be true, for otherwise no meaning can be conveyed (Pfister, 2010). Grice maintains that the importance of, at least, the first maxim of Quality is a prerequisite for the whole model of communication (e.g. Levinson, 2000; Horn, 1984). Therefore, as Vincent Marrelli (2002:

26) claims, “the oath of truthfulness’ itself, committing one to say ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’ involves not only the maxims of Quality (the accuracy and sincerity aspects of it) but also the various sub-maxims in the Quantity, Manner and Relation categories”. A thesis may be extrapolated from this that “lying is not a cooperative action at all, and thus not submitted to the operation of the cooperative principle. After all, the liar does not observe the maxim of Quality, and, consequently, he is opting out from the observation of the cooperative principle” (Meibauer, 2005: 1396). The premise that the Cooperative Principle holds only for truthful communication, with lies being excluded from the model, appears to carry the moral overtones of the framework.

In essence, Grice (1989b [1975], 1989d) does not allow subsuming lies under his idealised model of communication, acknowledging the privileged status of the first maxim and/or the supermaxim of Quality. It is perhaps because of the illegitimacy of this Quality violation that covert nonfulfilment is given short shrift in Grice’s (1989a) writings, while flouting is of primary importance to the model and accounts for conversational implicatures under the Cooperative Principle. A hypothesis can also be advanced that Grice’s idealised conversational framework does not include other maxims’ violations, which will be shown to engender deception without lying. Consequently, communication in accordance with the Cooperative Principle may be said to exclude deceit. Nonetheless, even if the first maxim of Quality is violated, the hearer starts processing the speaker’s utterance, assuming that the first maxim of Quality is observed, or rather not violated, since it may be flouted.

Disallowed as they may be in Grice’s original conceptualisation, lies, as well as other forms of deception, are commonplace in interpersonal interactions and deserve to be discussed in the light of the Gricean levels of meaning. Having observed that lying actually falls outside the Cooperative Principle as originally conceived, Meibauer (2005: 1396) rightly posits that lying is “rational communicative action, and therefore submitted to the operation of the cooperative principle”. It is then hardly surprising that Grice’s observations on lying should be expanded by neo-Griceans who tease out the workings of

lying and other forms of deception in the light of speaker meaning, maxims, and implicatures. Recent developments in linguistic research into lying and other forms of deception include notions such as: misleading implicatures based on violations (Thomas, 1995), lies as successful violations which produce no implicatures (Mooney, 2004), lies residing in implicatures (Meibauer, 2005, 2010), or conversational implicatures exploited to mislead (here, deceive without lying) (Saul, forth). Some of these postulates will be endorsed here, whilst others will be proven to be unsubstantiated.

3. Speaker Meaning

Lies and deception without lying are usually conceptualised in the context of the speaker's intention to deceive the hearer³ (Chisholm and Feehan, 1977; Adler, 1997; Mahon, 2008a, 2008b), whether about the contents of the message (e.g. Williams, 2002) or about the speaker's belief in the truth of the contribution that he/she is making (Frankfurt, 1992; Mahon, 2008a). Several authors (e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, 1977; Simpson, 1992; Frankfurt, 1988; Faulkner, 2007) thus advocate that the deceitful speaker has a twofold intention: that the hearer should believe that he/she believes a given message to be true, and that the message as such is true. These two interdependent dimensions of intention are related to Grice's notion of *speaker meaning* or the *utterer's/speaker's* meaning (Grice, 1989e [1969], 1989f [1968], 1989g [1957], 1989h [1982]).

Speaker meaning (a central type of *non-natural meaning* or *meaning_{NN}*) should be understood as the utterer's intention to produce a particular belief in the hearer on the strength of the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention (Grice, 1989g [1957]). Grice (1989e [1969]: 92) modifies the central proviso, stating that the utterer means something if he/she intends to elicit a particular response from the audience and wants the audience to be aware of this intention. Irrespective of which of the definitions is taken into account, the emergence of meaning is co-dependent on the audience, whose appreciation of the speaker's intention is the reason for the meaning's emergence (see Dynel, 2011c). This may be why Grice (1989g [1957]) denies the status of

³ However, there are exceptions to this prevalent view (e.g. Green, 2001; Carson, Sorensen, 2007; Fallis, 2009), notably definitions of lies as being anchored in the lack of truth, not necessarily the speaker's untruthfulness, (such definitions fail to include lies which rely on the speaker's mistaken belief of what is true), or definitions of lying embracing bald-faced lies (see Section 4.1.1).

non-natural meaning, and thus (indirectly) speaker meaning, to a behaviour which can be viewed as non-verbal deception:

I might drop B's handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that B is the murderer; but we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meant_{NN} anything or that I had meant_{NN} by leaving it that B was the murderer. (Grice, 1989g [1957]: 217)

In the case described by Grice, inferring what the communicator (handkerchief-dropper) intends him to, the hearer is oblivious to the former's underpinning intentions, which is why the communicative act will not carry meaning_{NN}, and thus speaker meaning. What Grice (1989g [1957], 1989e [1969]) proposes is that the communicator must overtly provide evidence of his/her intention to induce a belief, thereby excluding deception from the model of communication based on meaning_{NN} (Neale, 1992; Pfister, 2010). In other words, the Gricean account of speaker meaning fails to embrace situations where the speaker intends to communicate a meaning and have it gleaned by the hearer without having his/her underlying communicative intention recognised, as is the case of deception, including double bluffs based on "sneaky intentions" (Strawson, 1964; Schiffer, 1972). In essence, deceiving the hearer, the speaker nurtures an intention to induce a false belief in the hearer without having this intention recognised, contrary to the intention to communicate the meaning as if it is truthful. According to Fraser (1994: 145), "where the speaker intends the hearer to accept the false information as true (...) the speaker's intention to mislead is necessarily covert: you cannot expect to mislead the hearer by explaining that". Rightly, Castelfranchi and Poggi (1994) and Vincent and Castelfranchi (1981) make a distinction between *communicative communicated goals* (as well as intentions) and *concealed super-goals* indicative of deception.

The Gricean notion of speaker meaning, which also forms the bedrock for the CP (see Dynel, 2010, 2011c), must then be modified, so that it captures deception, as it is intentional communicative action as well. The hearer is not meant to appreciate the speaker's underlying deceptive intention, beyond the one of inducing a belief by dint of speaker meaning which is ostensibly truthful. It suffices if the overt communicative intention is recognised by the hearer, with the speaker meaning being the untruthful what is said and/or implicature. In practice, as the inferential process proceeds, the hearer need not consciously recognise any speaker's intentions, taking for granted that what he/she can gather is what the speaker expects him/her to. Conscious appreciation of the speaker's intention takes place primarily when the hearer is at a loss to understand the speaker, at least initially.

Incidentally, if the hearer discovers the speaker's aim to deceive him/her, thereby frustrating the speaker's communicative plan, the hearer may actually draw certain inferences as to the speaker's premises and infer meaning different from the speaker's intended meanings. Unless the speaker has planned a double bluff (deception based on the hearer's discovery of first order deception), his/her communicative plan goes adrift, for the hearer manages to infer meanings the speaker does not intend him/her to.

4. Levels of Speaker Meaning and Deception

Expressing what he/she believes to be true, the speaker may talk implicitly or explicitly, depending on whether he/she intends to communicate implicature or what is said, respectively, and only these intended meanings can be judged on their truthfulness. If the literal form of an utterance is meant to carry implicatures rooted in maxim flouting, its truthfulness is immaterial. According to Grice, the truth(fulness) of what is said and the truth(fulness) of implicature are independent:

Since the truth of a conversational implicatum is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be true – what is implicated may be false), the implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by “putting it that way”. (Grice, 1989b [1975]:39)

“Saying what is said” can lead to a situation when the implied meaning is the only meaning intended, with no speaker meaning materialised by what is said (thus, technically no what is said,⁴ which is defined as speaker meaning), which is the case of metaphor or irony. However, both what is said is and what is implied may be speaker-intended meanings (see Dynel, 2009, 2011c), in which case both the levels of meaning need to be judged in the context of their truthfulness. Therefore, several phenomena related to deception can be distinguished in the context of overt and covert nonfulfilment of the Gricean maxims.

⁴ This terms “say” and “what is said” are by no means used in reference to the phonetic realisation, the utterance as such, but are used in Grice's “favoured sense” (1989b [1975]: 25, 33, 1989c [1978]: 40), namely what the speaker means to communicate literally (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 25, 27, 33; 1989c [1978]: 46), based on the conventional meaning of the words used (1989c [1978]: 49). This interpretation also manifests itself in Grice's parlance: “saying” of what is said/what is said is “said” (1989b [1975]: 27, 39; 1989c [1978]: 41, 43, 51) or “expressed” (1989b [1975]: 32). Additionally, Grice (1989c [1978]: 40; 1989e [1969]: 86) unequivocally presents two types of speaker meaning: what is said vis-à-vis what is implicated conventionally and conversationally.

4.1. *Lying as the Violation of the First Maxim of*

Lying entails the violation of the Quality supermaxim, i.e. “Try to make your contribution one that is true”, and more specifically, the first Quality maxim, viz. “Do not say what you believe to be false” (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 27). Lies thus arise at the level of what is said, amounting to literally conveyed deceptive speaker meanings. From the hearer’s perspective, the maxim and the CP remain intact, as if they were followed. For a lie to succeed, the violation of the first maxim of Quality remains covert and the mendacious utterance is simply interpreted by the hearer as being truthful, which is compatible with the communicator’s intention and expectation. As Pfister (2010: 1276) rightly observes,

the speaker can intend to lie, that is, to assert something she believes to be false with the intention that the hearer believe it. But a lie presupposes the maxim of Quality: the speaker intends the hearer to believe what is asserted on the basis of recognizing this intention; the hearer will only believe what is asserted on the basis of recognizing the speaker’s intention if she presumes that the speaker is not asserting something false; therefore the speaker can only form the intention if she assumes the hearer to presume the speaker to follow the first maxim of Quality.

To an extent, this ties in with the perspective assumed by Mooney (2004), who rightly perceives successful (quiet and unostentatious) Quality maxims’ violations (which she distinguishes from unsuccessful violations⁵) as resulting in lies, which the hearer views as utterances adhering to maxims. However, Mooney (2004) does not differentiate between the two maxims (and, on the whole, discusses only maxim categories, rather than specific maxims), and thus she neglects the fact that not both of them give rise to lies.

From a different angle, Wilson and Sperber (2002) view the two Quality maxims as being related to what is said and the supermaxim to what is said and what is implied. Indeed, the supermaxim seems to pertain to all meanings communicated by the speaker, whether or not literally, while the two maxims necessitate being truthful when conveying meanings by dint of what is said. Nevertheless, paying attention to Grice’s requirement of truthfulness, Wilson and Sperber (2002) argue that supporting the truthfulness maxim, one will reach a stalemate when it comes to explaining the workings of figurative language (e.g. irony, metaphor and hyperbole), which is why their relevance theory

⁵ Proposing this notion, Mooney (2004) follows the ill-advised claim that humour the Gricean maxims (see Dynel (2009) for a critical

maxims' flouting is fully legitimate in the Gricean account and what seems to be said need not be truthful if it does not coincide with the speaker-intended meaning and an implicature arises, not a lie.

Thomas (1995: 74) notes that violation and flouting are opposites. Committing a violation, the speaker says "something which is 'true' (as far as it goes) in order to imply an untruth", while flouting a maxim, "the speaker blatantly fails to observe the maxim (...), but nevertheless implies something which is true". Stating this, Thomas (1995) mentions only the violation of the first Quantity maxim, juxtaposing it with Quality maxim flouting, neither of which are conducive to lying. The latter is a legitimate source of implicature, and the former promotes deception, yet not in the form of untruthful implicature, which Thomas wrongly suggests. Untruthful implicature, which can arise only thanks to flouting, is not tantamount to an (implied) lie (see Section 4.5). What Thomas (1995) fails to observe is that lying does not reside in implying or implicature but in what is said which is not truthful and operates on the violation of the first Quality maxim. Lying is not implied by violation but arises thanks to violation at the level of what is said.

Admittedly, along those lines, Saul (forth) postulates one of the conditions for lying, namely not speaking non-literally (e.g. using tropes, such as meta-phor or irony). Saul (forth) thus excludes lies residing in utterances which simultaneously entail implicatures. As a matter of fact, she does observe that lies may coincide with metaphors, but chooses to marginalise this issue, given her focus of investigation, namely the distinction between lying and misleading (here called "deception without lying"). This distinction is, nonetheless, precisely why such cases cannot be neglected, so that the full picture of deception can be presented.

Although the paramount claim made here is that lying arises at the level of what is said, based on maxim violation, a crucial provision must be made that sometimes the violation of the first maxim of Quality may be anchored in flouting, the epitome of which is figurative language use. Producing a metaphoric, ironic, metonymic or hyperbolic utterance, the speaker means the hearer to recognise the fact that the words uttered do not correspond to the intended meaning. The hearer is invited to make inferences and derive an implicature based on maxim flouting with no what is said being present. However, the meaning emerging through regular flouting typical of non-deceptive language use serves deception, which can be tantamount to lying. Such a lie, pivoting on covert untruthfulness, recruits the meaning generated thanks to overt untruthfulness. This is how Simpson's (1992) "ironic lies", i.e. lies couched in irony, can be explained. For instance, a woman says ironically, "Oh, I adored this silly comedy!", while actually believing that the lowbrow film was amusing, which she is reluctant to admit openly and thus she lies

since the ironic utterance can be rendered literally as, “I hated this silly comedy”. The same holds for metaphorical language use. For example, a man deceptively saying to a woman, “You are my oxygen”, means her to generate the implicature that it is impossible for him to live without her, which he believes to be false. Whilst the hearer may indeed infer this metaphorically implied meaning based on Quality and Manner maxims’ floutings, she is oblivious to the mendacity at the heart of the confession. This is a lie since the man’s premise is that he actually does not want to stay in a relationship with her. Rendered in non-metaphorical terms, the utterance violates the first maxim of Quality and reads, “I can’t live without you”. In essence, verbalised as a metaphor, the utterance is a lie at the propositional level.

A question arises as to how the distinction between implicature conducive to lying and implicature promoting deception without lying (see Section 4.5) should be drawn. Everything depends on whether a deceptive utterance entails both flouting of any maxim and violation of the first Quality maxim or only any flouting, respectively. To determine which is the case, one must discover whether the literal form of expression coincides with the speaker’s intended meaning in the form of truthful what is said, possibly accompanied by an (untruthful) implicature. If it does not, and it is only implicature (based on maxim flouting) that serves communicating the untruthful meaning, a lie comes into being. In other words, a (violation-based) lie is embedded in a non- literal utterance, whose literal level cannot coincide with speaker meaning due to maxim flouting, which the hearer does acknowledge. Paraphrased into literal means of expression, the speaker’s meaning still carries the same untruthfulness entailing the violation of the first maxim of Quality, of which the hearer is not aware. By contrast, deception without lying arises if the speaker’s what is said as such carries a truthful meaning, which the speaker communicates in addition to the untruthful implicature, which is usually the central meaning the speaker wishes to communicate. This meaning stems from any maxim flouting. To conclude, the difference between the two types of implicit untruthful meanings resides in whether what is said as such is truthful but is conducive to an untruthful implicature or whether the speaker’s meaning is necessarily dependent on maxim flouting leading to a meaning that involves the violation of the first maxim of Quality, which together yield the emerging untruthful meaning.

Finally, contrary to what Mooney (2004) claims, utterances based on violations, which coincide with lies, can foster implicatures. Those may be either truthful or untruthful (cf. Meibauer, 2005). For example, a pupil asks another, “Will you lend me a pen, please?”, whereby he elicits a reply, “I have only the one I’m using”, when the latter speaker believes he has a spare one, but is not willing to share it. In this reply, a lie is manifest at the level of what is said, yet

carrying a truthful implicature, “I won’t lend you a pen”. On the other hand, if in reply to the same question, the second pupil says, “I’m still writing but I’ll finish in a moment”, while he has already finished writing and he has no intention of sharing his pen, he not only tells a lie but also produces an untruthful implicature, “I will lend it to you when I’ve finished”.

4.1.1. *Bald-Faced Lies*

What is immediately relevant to lying is the notion of a bald-faced lie. Sorensen (2007) proposes the term “bald-faced lie” in reference to a false statement which is not disguised and which is not based on the speaker’s intention to deceive the hearer. The speaker knows that the hearer will not take the false utterance as being truthful/true. Most importantly, both the speaker and the hearer believe that the speaker’s assertion is not true, and each party believes that the other party believes this (Fallis 2010). On the understanding that lies are assertions which show at least narrow plausibility, further tested against broader knowledge, Sorensen (2007) argues that bald-faced lies do have this narrow plausibility but not wide plausibility, which is relative to the totality of evidence. Bald-faced lies are then unconvincing, given the body of evidence the hearer has, which is in accordance with the speaker’s expectation. Therefore, bald-faced lies are not meant to deceive the hearer and their seemingly deceptive nature is to be discovered by him/her.

A proverbial example of a bald-faced lie is the case of a witness in a trial who gives an untruthful testimony, not intending anybody in the court of law to believe it to be true or to perceive it as what he believes to be true (for a different view, see Carson, 2006, 2010). The speaker’s sole motivation is to avoid being harassed by the defendant or his associates. Carson (2006, 2010) also provides an example of a student who has cheated during an exam as has been failed by a professor. Privy to the Dean’s policy to never support a professor’s negative decision unless a student admits to having cheated, the student tells the Dean that he has not cheated in the hope of not being failed. At the same time, the student expects that the Dean will not believe that he is being truthful. Indeed, it seems hardly plausible that the intimidated witness or the audacious student who tell the bald-faced lies do mean to deceive the judge or the Dean, respectively, while the speakers do nurture other communicative intentions. In the first example, that the witness is scared of persecution following his truthful testimony; in the second example, that the pupil does not want to be failed. These examples of bald-faced lies show that untruthful propositions are meant to sound implausible so that the hearers pursue the real explanation of the speaker’s behaviour. On the other hand, if the hearer is indeed deceived, for instance the jury believes the witness’s untruthful testimony to be true

(Carson, 2006, 2010), a communicative failure in the form of unintended deception comes into being. This is, as Carson (2010: 20) states, an “unintended ‘side effect’” but, contrary to what he also claims, it cannot count as a lie, thanks to the speaker’s communicative intention not to deceive the jury.⁶ Nor is it the case that successful but unintended deception of the jury can be perceived as an implicature, as Meibauer (2011) seems to suggest. This is because implicature must be intended by the speaker (Dynel, 2009, 2011c).

Generally, the speaker’s intention to deceive the hearer is central to genuine lying, while bald-faced lies are meant to be recognised as being untruthful and/or untrue, or at least the speaker does not care if they are recognised as being thus. Therefore, a question arises as to whether such obvious, undis- guised untruthful statements should indeed be regarded as lies at all (Mahon, 2008a), because, by definition, an act of lying must be covert from the perspective of a person lied to. The folk term “bald-faced lie” should not be mistakenly equated with the concept of a lie approached theoretically.

It would also be wrong to suggest that bald-faced lies are reliant on the vio- lation of the first maxim of Quality. It is only ostensibly that they are, for speakers only pretend to be deceitful, with their pretence showing varied degrees of plausibility, but practically never being entirely convincing. Using Mooney’s (2004) parlance, one may venture to claim that bald-faced lies sub- scribe to unsuccessful violations, but this would again presuppose genuine deceitful intentions on speakers’ part. Bald-faced lies may then be considered to be dependent on flouting the first maxim of Quality, rather than (covert) violation thereof, so that the hearer can make inferences related to the speak- er’s motivation or goal. The speaker’s pretence to hold a belief based on the first Quality maxim’s flouting may actually be interpreted as implicature revealing his/her genuine motivation (cf. Meibauer, 2011).

4.1.2. *Lying and Other Maxims’ Violations*

It is evident that lies emerge from the violation of the first maxim of Quality, which is covert from the hearer. At a glance, it seems that it is only the violation of the first maxim of Quality that is immediately related to covert untruthfulness. Although Mooney (2004) attempts to argue that other maxim

⁶ This example should also be considered in the context of multiple hearer roles (see 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c). While the speaker has no intention of deceiving the jury or the judge, she may actually mean to deceive the defendant, another ratified listener who knows that the witness is lying that she is genuinely trying to lie to the hearers. It is, however, the defendant that is actually deceived.

categories can also be violated, she concedes that Quality violations enjoy a special status:

Successful violations other than straightforward violations of quality (lies) do exist and deserve attention. Successful violations can be implicated; in such cases the implicature generated will be false. In terms of which maxim is finally violated (rather than exploited), this always be the maxim of quality. Another maxim can be flouted, however, in giving rise to the false implicature. Straightforward violations of other maxims when possible seem better placed in other categories of nonfulfilment. The violations of maxims apart from quality are unsuccessful in so far as they can be detected. (Mooney, 2004: 914)

Mooney's (2004) argumentation appears to be specious. On the understanding that violations must be covert, there is little plausibility in her statement that various maxim violations are performed and detected, as a result of which a maxim Quality is violated. If the speaker chooses not to fulfil a maxim overtly so that the hearer arrives at an untruthful implicature, the maxim in question is flouted, rather than violated, as will be elucidated in reference to deception without lying (see Section 4.5). Also, the statement that violations can be "implicated", giving rise to false (here, untruthful) implicatures also provokes misgivings, for flouting and violation are two types of maxim non-fulfilment of equal status and yield meanings, which may sometimes be combined. Finally, violations of maxims other than the first maxim of Quality are also possible, yet they do not bring about lies, as discussed in the next three sections.

It may be claimed that if other maxims should also be unostentatiously violated in order to deceive the hearer, they only accompany the violation of the first Quality maxim (cf. Dynel, 2009). However, it will be shown here that other maxims can also be violated independently, even if such cases are neither prototypical nor frequent. Contrary to what some authors may state (e.g. Thomas, 1995), violations do not trigger implicatures, which inhere in floutings, but invite untruthful inferences at the level of what is said.

4.2. Violation of the Second Maxim of

The violation of the second Quality maxim "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 27) gives rise to *bullshit*, which the hearer takes to be truthful. The notion of *bullshit* pertains to statements which the speaker cannot judge according to their truth (Frankfurt, 2005, 2006; Carson, 2006, 2010) and which the speaker produces without sufficient knowledge about their validity (Frankfurt, 2005, 2006), yet presenting them as if they were truthful and/or the truth. Frankfurt (2005) claims that a

bullshitting speaker is unconcerned about the truth⁷ and it is the speaker's intention to deceive the hearer "about his enterprise" (2005: 54).

Bullshit counts as deception based on the violation of the second maxim of Quality, because the hearer is meant to nurture a misguided belief about the speaker's belief and the meaning conveyed. Even if the speaker means to deceive the hearer, his/her verbal action cannot be seen as lying. For instance, the president officially states that the troops have been withdrawn from Iraq to placate his fellow citizens, not having verified whether this is the case but only basing his statement on earlier reports, which may no longer be relevant. Thereby, he violates the second maxim of Quality and deceives his hearers. This is because the speaker intentionally induces in the audience a belief that he believes his proposition to be true and that what he is stating is actually true, neither of which is the case, in order to prevent further public outcry.

4.3. Deception without Lying via the Violation of the First Maxim of

Another form of deception without lying is rooted in the violation of the first Quantity maxim: "Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange" (Grice 1989b [1975]: 26). The violation of the first maxim of Quantity bifurcates into two manifestations: half-truths and remaining silent altogether (saying nothing at all), which are here viewed as mechanisms of deception without lying, contrary to some authors' claims.

Several authors (Vincent and Castelfranchi, 1981; Ekman, 1985; Vrij, 2000; Smith, 2004; Scott, 2006) argue that intentional withholding information, by merely producing half-truths or remaining silent, is actually lying. Some of the authors (Vrij, 2000; Smith, 2004) explicitly champion a very broad definition of lying, claiming that any form of behaviour orientated to making others form false beliefs or to depriving them of true beliefs is lying. Therefore, in the light of this interpretation, untruthfulness of what is said is not a necessary condition for lying, and any statement made with an intention to deceive the hearer is a lie (Bok, 1978; Barnes, 1994; Davidson, 1980). Moreover, according to Smith (2004: 14), merely depriving others of "true information" is lying, even if no false beliefs are created. The broader definition of lying also shows in the types/strategies of deception propounded by a few researchers (e.g. Douglas, 1976; Ekman, 1985). In tune with Chisholm

⁷ Carson (2010) claims that one can lie by producing bullshit. This view is not endorsed for a sine qua non for lying is the speakers' concern for what is

and Feehan's (1977) division of deception strategies, Douglas (1976) distinguishes *lies of commission* from *evasions*, i.e. lying by omission, which are not "out-and-out lies" (1976: 59). On the other hand, treating lying (a lie) and deception (deceit) synonymously and defining them as intentional misleading which is not signalled, Ekman (1985) proposes two primary methods of lying: to *conceal* and to *falsify*. Therefore, in his view, keeping a secret amounts to lying. What is also of relevance here is that Mooney (2004: 914) regards violations of the first maxim of Quantity⁸ as "lies of omission". However, such claims concerning withholding information are not convincing. As in the case of "bald-faced lies", "lies of omission" do not appear to be lies in a technical sense. Withholding information is not lying, given the standard definition thereof, and sometimes is not even deception.

As already hinted at, one can intentionally conceal information from someone without any intention that the other person should believe anything in particular at all (Ekman, 1985; Mahon, 2008a). A distinction must be drawn between a situation when the hearer is deceived and a situation when the hearer merely stays oblivious to some information. Allowing the hearer to be ignorant of something or cease having a true belief does not necessarily involve their acquiring a false belief, but only the speaker's keeping the hearer in ignorance or inducing the hearer's ignorance (Mahon, 2007). Omission should then be regarded as deception only if the hearer is meant to nurture a false belief as a result. Additionally, distinguishing between deception and mere ignorance-fostering depends on whether a particular matter is crucial for an individual and whether, oblivious to the knowledge the speaker has, he/she does or does not draw a particular inference. Mahon's (2007: 187) example of non-deceptive keeping an individual in ignorance is that of one person hiding a newspaper which contains information about a discovery of a new species of bird, as a result of which another person is oblivious to the discovery. It may be argued, however, that if the other party is an ornithologist preoccupied with discovering a new species of bird in the same area, this act will be a matter of deception, for the party concerned will nurture a belief that no new species has been discovered yet and will continue searching for it (until he/she reads a journal report).

⁸ Also, Mooney (2004) points out that Quantity maxim violations entail social when one is saying too much (being unable to talk to the point, being patronising, etc.) or too little (not being able to say more, being reticent, knowing only this little, etc.). However, if these effects were indeed recognised by the hearer, as intended by the speaker, such forms of nonfulfilment would count as floutings.

Since lies are defined as untruthful assertions, here defined as utterances which violate the first maxim of Quality, withholding information (saying nothing or not saying everything) cannot be interpreted as the same phenomenon. Saying nothing in order to induce a false belief results in no assertion being made, which also means that no truth value of a statement can be probed. For example, having discovered that his best friend's wife is having an affair, a man decides to keep this information to himself not to distress his friend, who frequently talks about his happy marriage. Given the nature of the relationship between the two men, the importance of the focal information, and many opportune moments to put an end to his friend's nurturing a false belief, the man's inaction, may be considered to be deceptive. All the same, the man cannot be said to have lied. Nonetheless, when one speaker attempts to elicit some information and the other interactant remains silent, a different phenomenon can be observed. As Grice (1989b [1975]) would put it, the person opts out. Such a failure to provide information cannot count as a violation of the Quantity maxim, because the silence is transparent to the hearer, who can thus infer that the interlocutor is reluctant to say anything or something in particular, possibly also inferring other meanings relevant in a particular situation. Following the example discussed, this would happen if the betrayed husband asked his friend, "Is my wife having an affair?", and the latter said nothing.

On the other hand, not telling the whole truth leads to a half-truth, which depends on selective display or editing the truth (Vincent Marrelli, 2002). According to Vincent and Castelfranchi (1981: 762), a half-truth is not giving the hearer all the information that would be the goal of the hearer if he/she knew the speaker had it, because it is relevant or important to the hearer. The speaker thus suppresses some information and, consequently, in the Gricean terms, violates the first Quantity maxim. The speaker does not say everything of relevance that he/she believes to be true in order to induce a false belief in the hearer, yet does not lie. Rightly, Saul (forth) subsumes half-truths under the category of "merely misleading", here called "deception without lying". This is the postulate supported here, inasmuch as the hearer is led to make false inferences on the basis of the truth told and what is not said. For example, having gone on holiday and left her dog with her friend, a woman calls him after a few days and asks, "How is my dog?", to which the man responds, "It was fine when I left the house today in the morning", while he did see the dog in the morning but has just received a phone call from his wife, thanks to which he knows that the dog is sick. The man's utterance is then deceptive but it is not a lie, because the utterance carries truthful what is said, and yet implies falsely that the dog is still fine, which is what the woman is supposed to infer,

so that she is not worried and enjoys her holiday. This half-truth is then based on the violation of the first maxim of Quantity and facilitates the untruthful implicature. Specifically, on the grounds of the preceding question, the implicature arises thanks to flouting the maxim of Relation. This example adduces evidence that implicatures come into being thanks to flouting, but it may be facilitated by violation.

In a similar vein, Thomas (1995) argues that violating the first maxim of Quantity may also lead to what she calls *misleading implicatures*. These are implicatures which are not truthful, and by which “speakers can imply a lie” (Thomas, 1995: 74). Thomas (1995: 73) provides two examples, both based on the violation of Quantity maxims, aiming to corroborate her claim that producing a truthful utterance, the speaker intentionally promotes what is here called untruthful implicature. However, the two examples differ to an extent and neither utterance fosters an implicature. Implicature cannot arise thanks to any violation, which occurs unbeknownst to the hearer. Thomas’s first example, quoted from literature, concerns a woman’s denial to her husband’s question, “Is there another man?”, “There isn’t another man”, which is truthful, but deceptive thanks to the violation of the first Quantity maxim, for the speaker fails to add that there is actually another woman. This instance subscribes to the category discussed in this section, since it is indeed based on the first Quantity maxim’s violation. However, it is not the case that any misleading implicature arises, even though the literal reply at the level of what is said invites the misguided inference (“My wife is not having an affair”) that the hearer duly makes. The inference is rather the result of the default, albeit faulty, presupposition on which the hearer bases his interpretation (“My wife is heterosexual”). The second example concerns a statement made by a press officer for a team after an athlete’s pulling out, “She has a family bereavement; her grandmother has died”. While the utterance is truthful and true, it transpires the next day that the real reason for the sportswoman’s withdrawal must be her having tested positive for drugs. In Thomas’s (1995) view, the statement triggers a misleading implicature that the cause of the champion’s withdrawal is her family problem, rather than drug abuse, owing to the violation of the first maxim of Quantity. If at all, this implicature would rather be a matter of flouting the Relation maxim. However, the press officer’s utterance seems to be based on a violation of the Relation maxim, insofar as the general public is meant to perceive the utterance as being pertinent to the earlier event (the sportswoman’s withdrawal), while the two are dissociated (see Section 4.4). The utterance then yields deceptive meaning, yet not an implicature, whose cause is the violation of the maxim of Relation and the first maxim of Quantity.

To summarise, withholding information entirely or telling a half-truth can be deemed as categories of deception without lying, as a consequence of sup-pressing the whole proposition or only its part, with two provisions (cf. Castelfranchi and Poggi, 1994). First of all, a half-truth must be told/some information must be suppressed with a view to deceiving the hearer. If no such intention on the speaker's part is present, the statement or lack of it cannot count as deception. For instance, during a job interview, asked about one's professional experience in a chosen field, a candidate does not reveal the information that he was dismissed for malpractice. This is not deception, inasmuch as the speaker does not wish to have the hearer believe something specific that he/she believes to be false. If, however, asked about his history of employment in general, the speaker does not mention having been discharged, the same omission will count as deception without lying, which is related to the other criterion.

The second criterion is the relevance (Castelfranchi and Poggi, 1994) of the information withheld to the issue at hand or its relevance for the hearer, of which the speaker is cognisant. In other words, a piece of information vital from the hearer's perspective remains unavailable to him/her as a result of the speaker's purposeful communicative action. Therefore, whether not telling the (whole) truth counts as deception should be judged in the light of what is relevant from the hearer's perspective, of which the speaker must be aware. This may manifest itself in the eliciting utterance. For instance, serving lasagne to her guests, the host says, "I've made lasagne a few times before", deliberately failing to mention that she always failed and the dish was inedible, which is the information the hearers would find relevant in the context. Similarly, in response to his girlfriend's question, "What did you do today during the lunch break today?", the man replies, "I had coffee". Thereby, he commits deception by eliding the information that he was accompanied by his fiancée, as he knows that his current girlfriend is very jealous and would not understand, even if she would like to know, that he is friends with the other woman and met her at lunch time.

4.4. Deception without Lying via Other Violations of

While Mooney (2004) states that Relation and Manner maxims can hardly be successfully violated, circumstances in which they are can be conceived of. For instance, Manner maxims (particularly the first one) are violated whenever the hearer is not meant to, and does not, appreciate the speaker's failure to be perspicuous. This happens in the case of a metaphor, which the speaker does

not mean to be successfully understood (Manner violation) or even recognised (Manner violation and the first Quality maxim's violation) by the hearer, who is thus deceived.⁹ By way of illustration, when the speaker deceptively says to the hearer, "Your skin is like a peach", the hearer is meant to, and does, understand this to be a compliment on her healthy complexion, couched in a metaphor based on flouting Manner maxims and the first maxim of Quality. Nonetheless, what the speaker does mean to convey but not to be discovered by the hearer is a distinct meaning. Capitalising on the violation (not flouting) of a Manner maxim, the speaker aims to say, "Your skin is covered in fuzz", thus deceiving the hearer. The same Manner maxim is then nonfulfilled yet in a different way, being unavailable to the hearer and thus coinciding with a violation, not a flouting. In other words, the speaker deceives the hearer about the nature of the nonfulfilment. What the hearer recognises as flouting is actually violation.

Moreover, a metaphor may be produced unbeknownst to the hearer, who is not privy to any nonfulfilment, notably that of the first maxim of Quality. For instance, on meeting a man whom she knows to be womaniser, a woman decides to teach him a lesson. Thus, asked, "What do you do?", she asserts, "I'm a teacher", intending him to treat this utterance literally, but actually producing a covert metaphor, which she does not wish him to recognise, let alone understand ("I will teach you a lesson and I will show you that I cannot be seduced"). Her statement is then based on the violation of Manner maxims and, consequently, the first Quality maxim. Therefore, due to the underlying metaphorical orientation of the utterance and the implicature, neither of which is meant to be appreciated by the hearer, the utterance is deceptive but it is not a lie.

Moreover, the Relation maxim can be violated as well (as already illustrated by Thomas's example of the press officer's statement). For example, when a teacher asks a student, "Why did you miss our last class?", and the student replies, "I was suddenly taken ill". While the assertion as such is indeed truthful and true, the answer is deceitful, since it is not the illness that prevented the student from coming, but his unwillingness to sit the test, but for which he would have participated in the class. Taking the student's utterance to fulfil the maxim of Relation, the teacher is meant to infer (at the level of what is

⁹ This strategy will be manifest in multi-party talk (cf. Dynel, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b), which one hearer (or more) is deceived, whilst others are privy to the truthful meaning and recognise the nonfulfilment as flouting, perceiving it as violation contrived for the other hearers.

said) that the illness was the actual cause of the absence. However, the student's reply is based on the Relation maxim's violation, which generates deception, together with the violation of the first maxim of Quantity.

The two examples discussed above may, at first glance, seem to be lies, given that the hearers are entirely oblivious to the fact that the utterances are not truthful (violate the first Quality maxim), either generally (the conversation between the man and the woman) or given the preceding co-text (the interaction between the teacher and the student). However, should the deception transpire, neither of the speakers can be held accountable for a lie. The woman might claim to have had her creative metaphor misunderstood, while the student will insist on having been genuinely ill.

Deception without lying may also come into being thanks to the violation of the second Quantity maxim, "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice, 1989b [1975]: 26). As Grice (1989b [1975]:

27) himself observes, "the hearers may be misled [deceived] as a result of thinking that there is some particular point in the provision of the excess of information", which may be the speaker's goal. It is not the case, however, that hearers appreciate that the maxim is not fulfilled, but only take all the information as being relevant and hence they are deceived. For instance, asked about the merits of a new model of a chosen car make, a sales manager produces a long list of advantages, which are applicable also to older models, whereby he invites the inference that the features are typical only of the new model.

All the examples discussed here show that acts of covert maxim nonfulfilment are conducive to deceptive inferences at the level of what is said, yet not untruthful implicature, unless they are meant to be seen as floutings by hearers. Untruthful implicature, a problem which echoed in earlier sections of this paper, is another vehicle for deception without lying.

4.5. Deception without Lying via Maxim Flouting/Untruthful

Meibauer (2005: 1382) avers that lies can reside in implicatures, not (only) assertions, when the speaker "conversationally implicated that *q*, but actively believed that not *q*". This can be done by either falsely implicating while telling the truth or by falsely implicating while uttering what is false (Meibauer, 2005). Also, contrary to the widespread claim that lying is a type of deception, Meibauer maintains that "false implicatures should not be treated as deceptions (as distinguished from proper lies)" (2011: 286). Differentiating between the two notions, Meibauer (2011) emphasises that this extended definition of a lie is not only terminological. Whilst the notion of untruthful

implicature¹⁰ appears to be correct, that of an implied lie is not convincing, because a lie, as traditionally defined by most authors, is a type of deception and an untruthful proposition, here what is said, not untruthful implied meaning (save lies based on tropes used in assertions, as already discussed in section 4.1). What also motivates Meibauer's (2011) postulate is the results of a survey conducted by Hardin (2010). Based on answers provided by 49 subjects, Hardin (2010: 3209) concludes that "the [untruthful] implicature itself was perceived as lying". Meibauer (2011: 286) thus claims that "extending the definition of lying is a quite natural move". Such a conclusion, based on scant empirical data regarding lay language users' perception of lies, seems to be unfounded in the light of the philosophical and linguistic literature on lying as being bound to asserting, here seen as what is said (and rarely stylistic figures based on flouting), not implicature deriving from it.

Saul (forth) deems lying as emerging from "what is said" and claims that, by contrast, conversational implicatures can be, and frequently are, exploited to mislead the hearer, here deceive the hearer without lying. She provides an example of an interaction in which one interlocutor is led to believe something that is not true in the speaker's view, by dint of an utterance which flouts the maxim of Relation but is not untruthful as such. By telling the truth in this conversational context, the speaker deliberately deceives the hearer, i.e. leading him/her to infer something that is not true, yet not lying, technically speaking.

Support is here given to the postulate that untruthful implicatures, captured by the notion of deception without lying, are rooted in maxim flouting employed with a view to deceiving, albeit not lying to, the hearer. In view of the nature of the preceding turn or conversational expectations, the speaker is fully aware what (untruthful) implicature his/her utterance will carry and wants it to be inferred by the hearer as the primary meaning. Additionally, as originally proposed by Grice (1989b [1975], 1989c [1978]), implicatures evince the feature of cancellability, which applies also to those of the untruthful type. Therefore, the implied untruthful import of an utterance can be cancelled without contradiction. In practice, the speaker can do this in order to deny his/her intention to deceive the hearer, should the speaker recognise the hearer's discovery of the implied mendacity of his/her utterance.

For example, one researcher may ask another, "Have you read my paper?", while the latter replies, "I have liked the examples very much", wishing the

¹⁰ Meibauer (2005, 2010) uses the notion "false implicature", but the epithet is not here given the distinction between truthfulness and falsehood, which Meibauer also appreciates.

interlocutor to infer that she has read the paper in question, which is actually not the case. The reply is then a manifestation of deception via an untruthful implicature anchored in flouting the Relation Maxim, as well as Manner and Quantity maxims. Should the author of the paper ask further questions, having been deceived, the deceitful speaker may cancel the implicature, for instance by saying, “Sorry, I have only browsed through the examples”.

Fallis (2009) provides another complex example of what he calls “falsely implicating”, which he does not regard as lying but another distinct form of deception. The example concerns a person wanting to convince the hearer that he is an actor by taking a theatrical pose and intone, “I am the Prince of Denmark”, which the speaker believes to be false and wishes to be recognised as such. By this impersonation, based on flouting the first Quality maxim, the speaker wants the hearer to infer that he is not the Prince of Denmark, which the utterance literally suggests, but that he is an actor, which is untruthful. The speaker thus wishes the hearer to be deceived by gleaning an untruthful meaning, “I am an actor”, originating in flouting Quality and Manner Maxims. In opposition to Fallis’s (2010) view, it is argued here, however, that this case may be regarded as a lie facilitated by an implicature, inasmuch as no truthful what is said present (as discussed in section 4.1. above).

Related to the distinction between untruthful what is said and implicature is the problem of whether the speaker is equally responsible for recognising lies rendered literally via what is said and inferring untruthful implicatures (cf. Green’s (2001) *caveat auditor*). In Meibauer’s (2005) view, deception without lying (in his parlance, lying which is embedded in implicature) is more painful, for the victim not only is misled but also experiences embarrassment if he/ she has collaborated in bringing about his/her own harm (Adler, 1997: 442). However, if deception is successful, the deceived party does not realise that he/ she has been taken in, which is why the last argument is not relevant to prototypical (successful) acts of deception. Only partial support is given to Adler’s (1997: 444) claim that “each individual is a rational, autonomous being and so fully responsible for the inferences he draws, just as he is for his acts. It is [deception without lying], but not lies, that require mistaken inferences and so the hearer’s responsibility”. In a similar vein, Saul (forth) claims that the victim of a misleading act (here deception without lying), which is couched in a misleading (here untruthful) implicature, which she ambivalently claims to be “merely conveyed”, bears partial responsibility for the false belief; whilst in the case of lying, it is the liar that is fully responsible. She motivates this by the fact that in “misleading”, the hearer has to make an inference to be deceived. Contrary to these claims, it should be stressed that inferencing is typical of the communication of all meanings but shows degrees of complexity. Admittedly,

what the authors capture under the concept “inference” is that the hearer needs to arrive at the speaker’s false-believed meaning by dissecting implicature, while this meaning does not present itself in what is said.

On the view espoused here, hearers rely equally on what is said and what is implied (Williams, 2002; Saul, forth). The speaker is held accountable for all speaker meanings, whether in the form of what is said or implicature, while the hearer is responsible for all inferences he/she makes on the basis of what is said or implicature, and it is not the case that he/she is more responsible for the latter. Incidentally, even unequivocally untruthful utterances based on untruthful what is said may entail complex inferential processes on the hearer’s part, depending on their formal materialisation (e.g. technical terms or convoluted style). Both in lying and in deception without lying, however, the speaker means the hearer to recognise and (continue to) nurture the false belief. Also, as Saul (forth) concedes, the hearer’s partial responsibility for making the inference prompted by a truthful statement, in accordance with the speaker’s intention, does not change the wrongness of the act.

5. Conclusions

Several postulates were put forward concerning deception types, maxim (non) fulfilment and the levels of meaning. It was argued here that lies reside in what is said which the speaker believes to be untrue, as suggested by Grice (1989b [1975]), whilst utterances whose literal meanings as such the speaker believes to be true but which invite untruthful inferences via other maxims’ violations or convey untruthful meanings in the form of implicatures are deceptive but are not lies. As evidenced in this paper, Grice’s notions facilitate distinguishing between lying and a number of manifestations of deception without lying.

First of all, lying entails the violation (not flouting) of the Quality super-maxim, specifically the first Quality maxim, which the hearer accordingly infers to be the speaker’s truthful literally conveyed meaning (sometimes also giving rise to truthful or untruthful implicature). Additionally, even if rarely, lies may also be dependent on such Quality violations, coupled with underlying maxims’ floutings which do not affect the literal proposition’s lack of truthfulness. The violation of the second Quality maxim gives rise to bullshit. Thirdly, bald-faced lies emerge from flouting the first maxim of Quality, rather than violation thereof, thereby not classifying as lies or deception, in a technical sense. Furthermore, withholding information (saying nothing or omitting to say everything) which can constitute deception without lying is rooted in the violation of the first Quantity maxim. Additionally, deception without lying may come into being thanks to the violation of the second Quantity

maxim or revolve around violations of Manner maxims and the Relation maxim, which may sometimes resemble floutings, from the hearer's perspective, yet classify as covert nonfulfilment. Finally, deception without lying can be contingent on various maxims' floutings conducive to cancellable untruthful implicatures, which the speaker means to be engendered by the hearer. Depending on the materialisation of an utterance, these phenomena may sometimes mesh. What is noteworthy is that violations may facilitate implicatures, yet not being immediately responsible for them (because implicatures emerge from floutings).

To summarise what has been proposed and show the complex interdependence between (un)truthful what is said and (un)truthful implicature, one example will be discussed, with several possible manifestations of deceptive responses:

B met his friend (C) in a pub the day before, as well as two days before. B likes C and is on very good terms with him. A (B's wife, who does not like C) returns from a two-day leave and asks B, "Did you meet C yesterday in a pub?", to which B replies:

- 1) No I didn't.
 - 2) Ten times! (sic!)
 - 3) No, I did not. And I never
 - 4) will. I don't meet people I
 - 5) don't like. I have fallen out
 - 6) with him.
 - 7) I met him two days
 - 8) ago. B gives A a
 - 9) frown.
- Obviously, your best friend was sitting at the next table and saw us.

In the first case, B lies, as he violates the truthfulness maxim, and also withholds other information (that he met C two days before). In the second case, the speaker comes over as being ironic primarily by flouting the first maxim of Quality to imply, "Of course I didn't". This proposition violates the first maxim of Quality and thus is a lie, yet capitalising on the underlying implicature, with no what is said being used. The third reply presents what is commonly known as a bald-faced lie based on overt nonfulfilment of the first maxim of Quality, which is not a manifestation of deception, on the grounds that the hearer is not expected to be taken in. In the fourth case, the speaker may be truthful at the level of what is said but implies via maxim flouting, notably that of the maxim of Relation, that he did not meet C, whereby he deceives his wife via untruthful implicature. On the other hand, the fifth reply both violates the first maxim of Quality, for B has not quarrelled with C, and carries an untruthful implicature (that B did not meet C) arising from maxim flouting. Therefore, it both constitutes a lie (in what is said) and deceives the

hearer implicitly. On the other hand, the sixth reply entails a half-truth and an implicature. It displays truthfulness at the level of what is said but deceives the hearer via implicature. Specifically, this reply relies on the violation of the second maxim of Quantity, as well as carries an implicature that the speaker did not meet C the day before, given the Relation maxim's flouting. The non-verbal reply (7) is tantamount to opting out, whereby B implicitly communicates a message which can be paraphrased as "It's none of your business". No deception comes into play, though, with all information being withheld. As regards the eighth response, the speaker hazards a guess, implicitly telling the truth (admitting to having met C), but at the same time he violates the second maxim of Quality, thereby bullshitting. In the last case, the speaker produces a metaphor, which the hearer is meant to observe, recognising the first Quality maxim's flouting, yet not to understand it correctly, based on Manner maxims' violation, not flouting. The two interpretations are: "He does not go out or have any entertainment" (the salient one) vs. "He drinks only wine", with the latter being the speaker meaning that the hearer is meant not to grasp. This constitutes the first level of deception. The speaker's utterance is also deceptive on another level, since he untruthfully implies, in the light of the Relation maxim's flouting, that he did not meet his friend. This sample analysis of one example alone suffices to appreciate the complexity of the web of deceit.

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